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Abstract -------------------------------
This paper proposes a model of job creation and destruction of the search and matching 
type.  The  model  is  able  to  replicate  the  magnitude  and  cyclical  behavior  of job  creation, 
destruction  and  reallocation  rates  in  a  segmented  labor  market  like  the  one  in  Spain.  The 
motivation is the similarity in the cyclical behavior of US and Spanish job reallocation (JR) rates 
despite the differences in job security regulations. This behavior contrasts to what is observed in 
the  rest of continental Europe,  where JR  is  acyclical.  The  model,  by  introducing a segmented 
labor  market,  makes  is  plausible  to  obtain  a  countercyclical  JR  rate  in  a  high  firing  cost 
economy.  In addition,  we  quantify the effects of a 40 % reduction in the  firing costs associated 
with  permanent  contracts.  The  main  results  are  (i)  negligible  effects  on  permanent  job 
destruction rates,  (ii)  significant effects  on job creation and  destruction (permanetltemporary) 
cyclical behavior, (iii) a 57 % increase in the job conversion rate from temporary into permanet 
jobs and a 12 % reduction in the temporary employment rate. 
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The purpose in this paper is  twofold.  First, we  build a search and matching 
model that is  able to replicate the magnitude and cyclical behavior of job 
creation, destruction and reallocationl  rates in a segmented labor market like 
the one in Spain.  Second, we quantify the effects of a reduction in firing costs 
associated with permanent jobs for  the magnitude and cyclical behavior of 
job creation, destruction and reallocation rates, the temporary employment 
rate and the job conversion rate from temporary into permanent contracts. 
The motivation of the paper is  the similarity in the cyclical behavior of 
US  and Spanish job creation (JC), destruction (JD) and reallocation  (JR) 
rates despite the differences in job security regulations (see Table 1).  In par-
ticular, job reallocation rates are countercyclical in both labor markets. 
Tabla 1:  JC, JD and JR correlations with the cycle  (NET)2 
Country (period)  Corr(JC,NET)  Corr(JD,NET)  Corr(  JR,NET) 
US  (1972-1986)  0.90  -0.958  -0.519 
Spain (1990-1996)  0.602  -0.895  -0.531 
This observation is inconsistent with one of the main conclusions drawn 
from the recent literature on job creation and job destruction in the OECD3 , 
i.e.,  countries with higher firing costs tend to have lower correlations of JR 
rate with the cycle.  This regularity seems to be validated except for  Spain 
(see this in Table 2, where some OECD countries have been ordered according 
to the stringency in job security provisions). 
According to this literature, the countercyclical behavior of job realloca-
tion rates in Anglo-xason countries is  due to negligible firing  costs.  These 
economies are considered more efficient in the sense that they are able to re-
allocate when the opportunity cost (in terms of output losses) is lower, that 
is, in recessions.  In contrast, job reallocation rates in continental Europe are 
1 Job reallocation is  defined as the sum of job creation and job destruction. 
2Notes:  (1)  Corr(JC, NET), Corr(JD,NET)  and Corr(JR,NET) are the correlations 
of job creation, destruction and reallocation rates with net employment rate (NET), the 
indicator of the cycle.  Source:  USA,  Davis et al.(1996);  Spain, own designed using firm-
level data from the survey "Encuesta de  Coyuntura Laboral". 
3See  Garibaldi (1997),  Garibaldi, Konings and Pissarides (1996),  OECD Employment 
Outlook (1994), Millard y Mortensen (1997). 
1 acyclical because  high firing  costs  prevent the necessary  reallocation from 
taking place in recessions.  However,  this does  not seem to be the case  in 
Spain. 
Table 2:  Mean reallocation rate and its correlation with the cycle4. 
Country  US  Canada  UK  Germany  Norway  Spain  Italy 
Period  84-91  83-91  73-86  83-90  77-86  90-96  84-91 
Mean  22.0  20.0  - 12.6  - 24.0  2l.3 
Corr  -0.52  -0.48  -0.95  0.04  -0.13  -0.53  0.11 
In the light of what happens in  the Spanish labor market,  the obvious 
question is  how  to reconcile this observation with the results from previous 
studies, that is,  what are the factors that make it possible to have a coun-
tercyclical JR rate in a high firing costs economy. 
The answer lies  on the segmentation that characterizes the Spanish la-
bor market.  By looking at job creation, destruction and reallocation rates 
dissagregated  by  permanent  (JCP, JDP, JRP)  and temporary employment 
(Jet, JDt, JRt), it is  easy to see  that the magnitude and cyclical behavior 
of Spanish aggregate rates are mainly due to the behavior of temporary em-
ployment (see table 3). 
Table 3:  Job creation, destruction and reallocation rates in Spain5 
JC  JD  JR  JCP  JDP  JRP  JCt  JDt  JRt 
Mean  2.7  3.2  5.9  2.7  3.0  5.8  1l.9  13.1  25.0 
Corr.  0.6  -0.89  -0.53  0.24  -0.48  -0.18  0.43  -0.7  -0.36 
Temporary contracts were  liberalized in  Spain in  1984  and since  then, 
firms  have  made widespread use  of them6.  There are two  reasons for  that 
4Notes:  (1)  Mean stands for  the annual job reallocation rate (average).  (2)  Corr.  is 
the correlation of the job reallocation rate and net employment rate (NET). (3)  The unit 
of study is the plant, except for Canada and Italy, where the unit of study is the firm.  (4) 
The employment sector is manufactures, except for Spain, where services are also included. 
(5)  Sources:  OECD Employment Outlook and own designed 
5Notes:  (1)  Source:  own designed with quaterly firm-level  data from the survey En-
cuesta de Coyuntura Laboral (ECL)  covering the period 1990-96.  The unit of study in 
the ECL is  the plant.  The sectoral coverage is  manufacturing and services  (excluding 
Public Administration).  (2)  The first  row  shows  aggregate  and disaggregate  (tempo-
rary  /permanent) job creation, destruction and reallocation rates (averages).  The second 
row shows the correlations of these rates with net employment rate. 
GIn  Spain,  one out of three contracts is  temporary, while  in the rest of Europe the 
2 behavior.  First, they allow employment adjustments at a low cost, since the 
associated legal firing costs to temporary jobs are very low7.  Second,  until 
1994, firms could freely use temporary contracts without having to justify the 
temporary nature of the activity,  using the so  called"  contrato de fomento 
de empleo" 8. 
The introduction of these cheap contracts, joint with the high firing costs 
associated to permanent jobs, has generated a segmented lab  or market, where 
workers in permanent jobs have  a very low  probability of being fired  while 
temporary workers  suffer  the  main  adjustments.  The  usual  practice  has 
been hiring workers on a temporary basis, usually for  3 years (the maximun 
duration allowed),  firing  them upon contract expiration and,  at the same 
time, hiring new temporary workers to fill  the same positions. 
In  sum,  the Spanish  labor market  may  appear quite  dynamic just by 
looking at the cyclical behavior of aggregate job creation, destruction and 
reallocation rates, but this might be misleading.  On the one hand, firms fire 
permanent workers less  than it would  be efficient  (labor hoarding)  and, on 
the other hand, there is segment of the lab  or market suffering from excessive 
turnover. 
Trying to rationalize the consequences  of these  specific  features  of the 
Spanish labor market is  one  of the objectives in this paper.  For that pur-
pose, we  build a model, similar in spirit to the job creation and destruction 
model proposed by  Mortensen  and Pissarides  (1994),  and introduce some 
new elements to capture those specific features.  The first one is the existence 
of a Segmented Labor Market with two types of jobs:  permanent and tempo-
rary, differing in the maximum duration of the contract and in the associated 
firing costs9  and held by  homogeneous workers.  Second,  in contrast to pre-
temporary rate is  around 8%. 
7In the period under study (1990-96), firing costs are 12 days salary per year worked in 
some temporary contracts and zero in others.  Unfair dismissals of workers in permanent 
contracts entail a cost of 45  days salary per year worked with a maximum of 42 monthly 
salaries, while in case of fair dismissals the costs are 20 days salary per year worked with 
a maximum of 12 monthly salaries. 
8The possibility of hiring workers using this type of contract was eliminated in 1994, 
but they have been in place until 1997. 
9We  will assume that temporary contracts do not entitle to firing costs, since in most 
cases they are very low or even zero. 
3 vious models in this literature, the model is  set in discrete time10.  In this 
labor market firms will be heterogeneous agents and will use these two types 
of contracts to adjust their employment  levels  when  facing  aggregate and 
idiosyncratic persistent shocks.  We  follow  Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) 
by assuming one-job firms. 
Before going into the details of the model, it is convenient to explain the 
timing and agent's decisions.  At  the beginning of the period,  both aggre-
gate and idiosyncratic shocks affecting firms are revealed.  Then, firms  and 
workers renegotiate wages.  Given new wages,  each firm  decides whether to 
fire  or not its actual worker, taking into account that firing costs depend on 
worker's previous wage.  Firms with temporary workers take a similar deci-
sion.  However, firms, whose temporary contracts expired last period, decide, 
in fact, whether to convert or not the temporary contract into a permanent 
job, knowing the consequences regarding future firing costs.  Once all these 
decisions  have  been  made,  production starts both,  in firms  where workers 
have not been fired this period and in those that were matched with unem-
ployed workers at the end of last period.  Finally, search decisions are made: 
firms  post vacancies  and unemployed  workers  apply for  jobs.  This search 
process will generate new matches that will be productive next period.  We 
will also assume that every job is created as a temporary job. 
The model is  calibrated to the Spanish economy and we  test its validity 
to replicate the behavior of job creation and job destruction in that economy. 
In addition, we  quantify the effects of a 40% reduction in firing costs for the 
magnitude and cyclical behavior of the variables of interest.  Such a reduction 
(i) has negligible effects on the magnitude of permanent job destruction rates, 
(ii) significant effects on job creation and destruction (permanent/temporary) 
cyclical  behavior,  (iii)  increases  the job conversion  rate by  57%  and  (iii) 
reduces the temporary employment rate by 12%.  Moreover,  this simulation 
exercise shows that the aggregate job creation and job destruction statistics 
lOThis is  necessary for  two reasons.  First, firms need to know worker's previous wage 
when considering whether to fire  or not a worker,  since firing costs are computed using 
this information.  That is,  worker's previous wage is  a state variable.  Second, tenure in a 
temporary contract is  also a state variable, since temporary contracts have a fixed-term 
duration. 
4 can be very similar in a  rigid  (high firing costs)  and in a  flexible  economy 
(low firing costs). 
The outline of the paper is  as  follows.  In Section 2,  we  briefly review 
previous literature.  In Section 3,  we  present the model.  In Section 4,  we dis-
cuss its calibration.  In Section 5,  we  show simulation results.  In Section 6, 
we  comment the results obtained from the reduction in firing costs.  Finally, 
Section 7 draws some conclusions. 
2  Related literature 
The pioneer empirical studies in this literature are due to Davis and Halti-
wanger  (1990,1992).  Using firm-level  data,  they document the magnitude 
and cyclical behavior of job creation and destruction rates in the US  econ-
omy.  Among their findings, one of the most interesting is the countercyclical 
behavior of the JR rates.  Following Davis and Haltinwanger (DH), a number 
of empirical studies have applied the same methodology to some European 
countries:  Boeri y Cramer (1993)  for  Germany,  Contini and Revelli  (1987) 
for Italy, Konings (1995) for the United Kingdom (UK), Dolado and G6mez 
(1995)  and Garda-Serrano and Jimeno (1997) for  Spain.  The most relevant 
result from this research program is the acyclical behavior of the JR rates in 
the European economies, except for the UK. 
These differences in the cyclical behavior of JR rates across labor mar-
kets are frequently attributed to differences in employment protection regula-
tionsll.  While the job creation technology is slow and costly in both types of 
economy, the job destruction technology is instantaneous in the Anglo-xason 
countries due to lower firing costs. 
At the same time, a number of theoretical studies have  been developed 
trying to rationalize the observed facts.  The most important contribution is 
the stochastic endogenous job creation and destruction model by Mortensen 
and Pissarides (1994).  In this model, the exogenous job destruction rate in 
11 Bentolila y  Bertola (1990)  y  Bertola (1990)  conclude that differences in firing  costs 
explain differences in the dynamic behavior of employment, but they do not necessarily 
imply a higher unemployment rate 
5 the classic search and matching model by Pissarides (1990)  is  endogenized. 
Subsequently, Pissarides (1994)  and Mortensen (1994)  introduce on the job 
search.  These models are  able  to reproduce the "stylized facts"  observed 
in the US  economy:  (i)  job creation and destruction flows  coexisting in all 
phases of the cycle,  (ii)  a lot of heterogeneity among plants and (iii)  a very 
volatile job destruction process. 
However,  these  models  cannot  account  for  the cyclical  behavior docu-
mented in the European countries.  Garibaldi (1998),  in a modified version 
of the Mortensen-Pissarides (1994) model, has reproduced the acyclical real-
location rate observed in most European economies by introducing elements 
of employment protection.  In his model, job destruction is also endogenous, 
but firms cannot get rid of their labor force  instantaneously.  The process of 
firing a worker is slow and costly since firms must wait for an administrative 
authorization before firing a worker. 
Garibaldi's model, while able to explain the behavior of job creation and 
job destruction in  most European economies,  does not look appropriate to 
account for  the Spanish facts.  Thus, the first  goal in this paper is to build 
a  model that is  able to account for  that behaviour.  For that purpose,  we 
introduce  two  specific  features  of the Spanish  labor market:  (i)  the exis-
tence of two types of contracts (permanent and temporary), differing in their 
maximun duration and in firing  costs,  and (ii)  the possibility of converting 
a  temporary contract into a  permanent one.  Modelling the process of job 
creation and job destruction in that way,  it is  possible to study separately 
the cyclical properties of job creation and destruction by type of contract 
and analyze the effects of a reduction in firing costs associated to permanent 
contracts for permanent job creation and destruction rates. 
6 3  Model 
3.1  Population 
The economy  consists  of a  continuum of workers  with unit mass12  and a 
continuum of firms.  Workers can either be employed or unemployed13.  Un-
employed workers look for employment opportunities; employed workers pro-
duce and do not search on the job.  Each firm is a one-job firm.  The job might 
be occupied and producing or vacant. 
The source  of heterogeneity  is  due  to  the existence  of matchings with 
different quality levels,  durations, and firing costs (that depend on previous 
wage).  Therefore, the state space that describes the situation of a particular 
worker is  S = {{O, I} x £  x D x  [0, w]}, where £ = {El, ... , En}  is  a discrete 
set, the quality levels,  D  =  {dl , ...  , dN }  is  a discrete set denoting tenure on 
a particular job and wages take values in an interval [0, w].  Therefore, each 
quadruple indicates whether the worker is  unemployed  (0)  or employed  (1) 
and, in that case, the quality of the match, worker's tenure and his previous 
wage.  Note that the state space is  continuos since the wage  takes values in 
an interval. 
3.2  Preferences 
Workers have identical preferences, live infinitely and maximize their utility, 
which  is  taken to be  linear in  consumption.  We  assume that they supply 
work  inelastically,  that is,  they will  accept  every  opportunity that arises. 






where /3, °  :s;  /3  < 1,  is  the discount factor and Ct  is consumption.  Firms 
are also risk neutral. 
12We assume a zero population growth rate. 
13We do not considered other labor market states out of the labor force 
7 3.3  Technologies 
We  assume that there are two  technologies in this economy:  a  production 
and a matching technology. 
3.3.1  Production technology 
Each job is  characterized  by  an  irreversible  technology  and  produces  one 
unit of a  differentiated  product per period,  whose  price  is  Y(Zt, Et),  where 
{zd is an aggregate productivity component, common to every job, and {Et} 
is  a specific component, i.e.  the quality of the match.  Each new matching 
(assumed to be temporary) starts with the same entry level Ee,  a relative low 
quality level.  From this initial condition, the quality of the match will evolve 
stochastically due to shocks, {Zt, Ed. 
The aggregate shock, {Zt},  is  modeled as a statiopary and finite Markov 
chain, with transition probabilities I1(z'lz)  =  Pr{Zt+l  =  z'lzt =  z} where z, 
z'  E  Z = {I, 2, ... , nz}.  The idiosyncratic component,  {Et},  is  also modeled 
as  a stationary and finite  Markov chain.  This process is  the same for  every 
matching and, conditioning on Zt+l' the realizations Et+l are independent and 
identically distributed with conditional transition probabilities 7f(E'ic, z')  = 
Pr{  Et+lIEt, zt+d, where E,  E'  E £ =  {I, 2, ... , nE}.  Therefore, the joint process 
{E, z} is  a Markov chain with nE  x nz  states with transition probabilities 
In this paper, we  assume that both stochastic processes are independent. 
This implies r[(E', Z')I(E, z)]  =  I1(z'lz) *  7f(E'ic).  In addition, we  assume that 
agents know the laws of motion of both processes and observe their realiza-
tions at the beginning of the period. 
3.3.2  Matching technology 
As  before mentioned,  every job is  created as  a  temporary job.  Temporary 
jobs are  created by  firms  that post vacancies  in  the market.  We  assume 
free  entry in the creation of vacancies.  Thus, posting a vacancy is  not job 
creation, unless it is  filled.  Finally,  there is  a  cost  associated to posting a 
vacancy, c. 
8 
III In each period, vacancies and unemployed workers are stochastically matched. 
We  assume the existence of an homogeneous of degree  one  matching func-
tion m  =  m(ut, Vt),  increasing and concave  in  both arguments, where  Vt  is 
the number of vacancies  and  Ut  the number of unemployed  workers,  both 
normalized by  the fixed  labor force.  The application process is  as  follows. 
Workers can only apply to one job each  period.  Given this restriction and 
the assumption that workers supply curve is inelastic, their decision is trivial. 
They will accept a job whenever there is a contact. 
These assumptions allow  us  to define  the transition rates for  vacancies 
and unemployed workers.  The vacancy transition rate, q,  is  defined  as  the 
probability of filling a vacancy and is given by 
q(v) =  m(~,u) = m  (1,~) 
The transition rate for  unemployed workers,  a, is  defined as  the proba-
bility of finding a job and is given by 
a (v)  = m (:'  u)  = m (;,  1  ) 
Given that the homogeneity of degree one in the matching function, these 
transition rates depend only on v =  v/u, a measure of tightness in the labor 
market. 
On  the other hand,  permanent jobs are  created  when  firms  decide  to 
convert a temporary job into a permanent one.  This can be motivated by 
a good realization of the joint process  {E, z}.  In  particular, conversion will 
take place for  realizations above a specific threshold that firms determine. 
3.4  Equilibrium 
The concept of equilibrium used is the recursive equilibrium.  In each period, 
the aggregate state of the economy is  described by the pair (J1, z),  where  J1 
represents the matching distribution by  quality levels,  tenure and previous 
wages.  In  the following I will describe firms and workers problems. 
9 3.4.1  Problem of a firm with permanent job 
The vector of states for this firm is  (E, W-1, j1, z), where E  is the quality of the 
match, W-l the previous wage  and the pair (j1, z)  represents the aggregate 
state in this economy14. 




where  JP(E,W_1,j1,Z)  is  the  firm  value  function,  W(E,W_1,j1,Z)  is  the 
wage, previously determined in a bilateral negotiation between the firm and 
the worker,  cf(w-d is  the firing cost, that depends on the previous wage, 
Jt(Ee, d1, j1', z')  is  the value function of a firm with a first period temporary 
job, J O(j1, z)  is  the value of a vacancy and the function G(j1, z, z')  describes 
the distribution law of motion. 
The decision  rule  for  this firm  is  denoted by  gP (  E, W -1, j1, z) .  The firm 
must decide whether to continue with the actual match, gP(E, W-l, j1, z)  =  1, 
or whether to fire the worker and look for a new one, gP(E, W-1, j1, z)  =  o. 
Note that the problem is different for a firm whose temporary contract ex-
pired in the previous period.  Let us denote n the maximum number of periods 
for  a temporary contract.  In this case,  the vector of states is  (E, dn+1, j1, z), 
14Since the state variable W-l takes values in an interval, the state space, S  =  { {O, I} x 
[  x  D  x  [0, w]},  is  continuum and, the value functions are infinite-dimensional objects. 
There are two approaches to deal with this problem.  The first  one is  to discretize the 
state space, that is,  to partition the wage  support considering only a  finite  number of 
wages.  The drawback is that the wage is  not an exogenous variable, but an endogenous 
one,  determined in  the bargaining process.  Therefore, this approach will  be unreliable 
and restrictive, unless the partition is  very fine.  But then, the problem is that the state 
space increases too much.  The other approach consists in partitioning the wage support 
to evaluate the value functions  using linear interpolation when  the argument W-l  falls 
outside the grid.  This is  the approach followed  here, so that the value functions are still 
infinite-dimensional objects and wages are not restricted to take values in a discrete set. 
10 
"I where dn+1  indicates that if the worker is  not fired  at the beginning of this 
period, this worker will start the subsequent period as a permanent worker. 
His  previous wage  is  not part of the state vector because the firing cost at 
the beginning of the period would be zero.  The problem of this firm  can be 
written as 
max{y(z, c)  - w(c, dn+1, p"  z) +  (3 L r[(c', z')I(c, z)]JP(c', w, p,', z'), 
f',Z' 
-c + (3q(p"  z) L I1(z'lz)Jt(ce, d1, p,', z') + (3(1  - q(p"  z))JO} 
Zl 
s.t. 
p,' = G(p"  z, z') 
The decision rule is gP( c, dn+1,  p"  z)  =  1 if the firm converts the temporary 
contract into a permanent one and gP(c, dn+1,  p"  z)  =  0 if the firm  decides to 
fire  the worker and start looking for  another one. 
3.4.2  Problem of a  firm with a temporary job 
The vector of states for  this firm  is  (c, d, p"  z),  where d represents tenure at 
the beginning of the period.  Note that the previous wage  is  not part of the 
state vector, since firing costs are zero for this type of contracts.  The problem 
of this firm is 
max{y(z, c)  - w(c, d, p"  z) +  (3 L r[(c', z')I(c, z)]Jt(c', d + 1, p,', z'), 
€' ,z' 
-c +  (3q(p"  z) L I1(z'lz)Y(ce, d1, p,', z') + (3(1  - q(p"  z))JO(p"  z)} 
Zl 
s.t. 
p,'  =  G(p"  z, z') 
11 where  P(E, d, IL, z)  is  the value function for  this firm  and W(E, d, IL, z)  is 
the wage,  previously determined in a bilateral negotiation between the firm 
and the worker. 
The firm must decide whether to continue with the match, gt(E, d, IL, z)  = 
1,  or to fire  the worker and look for  another one, gt(E, d, IL, z)  =  o. 
Note that due to the limited duration of temporary contracts to n periods, 
the problem of a firm with a temporary contract in the last period is 
max{y(z, E)  - W( E, dn , IL, z) +  (3 L r[(  E', Zl) I  (E, z)]JP( E', dn+1, IL', Zl), 
E' ,z' 
-c +  (3Q(IL, z) L II(z'lz)Jt(Ee, d1, IL', Zl) + (3(1  - q(IL, Z))JO(IL, z)} 
Zl 
s.t. 
IL'  =  G(IL, Z, Zl) 
3.4.3  Problem of a  worker in a  permanent job 
The problem of this worker is  trivial.  In fact,  his decision is  indirect since 
he negotiates with the firm  over the wage  before the firm  decides upon his 
continuation. 
<D(gP  =  1) [w( E, W-l, IL, z) +  (3 L r[(  E', Zl) I  (E, z)]VP( E', w, IL', Zl)] 
£' ,z' 
where  VP(E, W-l, IL, z)  is  the value  function  for  this worker,  <D(x)  is  an 
indicator function that takes the value 1 if the assessment is  true and zero 
otherwise, and VO(IL, z)  is  the value function for  an unemployed worker. 
3.4.4  Problem of a  worker in a  temporary job 
His problem is also trivial. 
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where vt(  E, d, /1, z)  is the value function of a worker in a temporary job. 
3.4.5  Problem of an unemployed worker 
Unemployed  workers  look  for  employment  and  accept  a  job whenever  an 
opportunity arises.  The value function for  an unemployed worker is 
Zl 
;3(1 - a(/1, z)) L II(z'lz)VO(/1', z') 
Zl 
where Vt(Ee, d1, /1', z')  is  the value function of a temporary worker in his 
first  period.  The parameter b can be interpreted in two  ways.  It could be 
some kind of unemployment subsidy.  Under this assumption, we would need 
a public sector to raise taxes.  The other interpretation is that b is the return 
to home production, assuming that every household have access to the same 
production technology.  This technology allows  them to produce b units of 
the period consumption good every period. 
3.4.6  Wage determination 
Wages are the result of a bilateral bargaining between the worker  and the 
firm.  Bargaining is  dynamic,  that is,  wages  are revised  every  period upon 
occurrence of new  shocks.  This assumption is  reasonable due to existence 
of sunk costs  (search costs)  once the match is  produced.  This creates local 
monopoly power and generates a surplus to be split among the participants 
in the match.  This surplus, in the case of a permanent contract, is  defined 
as 
13 JP(c, W-l, IL, z) - (JO(IL, z) - Cf(W-l)) + 
VP(c, W-l, IL, z)  - (VO(IL, z) + Cf(W-l)) 
Wages are obtained by  maximizing the following Nash product with re-
spect to the wage 
Wages are set so that the surplus of the match, SP(c, W-l, IL, z), is split in 
fixed  proportions.  In equilibrium 
where 0 indicates workers bargaining power. 
In general, the determination of wages using dynamic bargaining implies 
having to solve a fix  point problem, since the value functions that define the 
surplus to be maximized depend on  the wage.  However,  in this case,  it is 
possible to avoid this computational problem.  The assumption of free entry 
in the creation of vacancies  allow  us  to obtain an expression for  the wage 
from the first order condition that only depends on the transition rates for 
a vacancy and a worker and on parameters. That expression is independent 
of the value functions and is  given by 
[ 
ca(z)]  w(c, W-l, z)  =  (1 - O)b + 0  y(c, z) +  q(z)  + (1  - /3)Cf(W-l) 
Wages associated to temporary contracts are obtained by maximizing a 
similar expression, where cf(w-d=O. 
14 3.4.7  Definition of Equilibrium 
A recursive equilibrium is a list of value functions JP(E, W-l, j1, z), JP(E, dn+1, j1, z), 
P(E, d, j1, z), VP(E, W-l, j1, z), VP(E, dn+1, j1, z), Vt(E, d, j1, z), JO (j1, z), VO(j1, z), 
transition rates q(j1, z),  a(j1, z),  prices  W(E, W-l, j1, z),  W(E, d, j1, z),  decision 
rules gP(E, W-l, j1, z), gP(E, dn+1, j1, z)  and gt(E, d, j1, z) and a law of motion for 
the aggregate state G(j1, z, z')  such that 
1.  Optimality:  Given  the functions  q(j1, z),  a(j1, z),  W(E, W-l, j1, z)  and 
W(E, d,  j1, z), the value functions JP(E, W-l, j1, z), JP(E, dn+1, j1, z), P(E, d,  j1, z), 
VP(E, W-l, j1, z),  VP(E, dn+1, j1, z)  and Vt(E, d,  j1, z)  satisfy the Bellman 
equations. 
2.  Free  entry:  This condition and the profit maximization condition guar-
antee that in equilibrium the number of vacancies adjust to eliminate 
all rents associated to holding a vacancy; that is, JO(j1, z)  =  0, implying 
Zl 
3.  Wage  bargaining:  The equilibrium conditions from maximizing the sur-
plus are 
4.  Rational expectations:  Individual decisions generate a distribution over 
tomorrow's aggregate state that is equivalent to the distribution implied 
by G(j1, z, z'). 
In this literature it is usual to concentrate only on equilibria where wages 
do  not  depend  on  the unemployment  rate.  We  will  follow  this  practice. 
Wages will depend on the aggregate shock but they will be independent of 
15 the distribution.  The fact  that such  an equilibrium might exists is  due to 
the timing and the assumption of free  entry in  the creation of vacancies. 
Wages  do  not depend  on  the unemployment  rate because  this  is  not the 
variable of interest for  workers,  but the rate at which workers find jobs,  Q:. 
By  homogeneity of the matching function,  Q:  depends  on v/u and on the 
aggregate state z.  But v/u is  unknown when bargaining takes place, so that 
wages will only depend on the aggregate shock.  That is,  vacancies are not a 
state variable, they are forward-looking variables, unknown when bargaining 
is taking place. 
The possibility of concentrating in this type of equilibria, in which  the 
variables of interest are independent of the distribution is very useful because 
we  do  not need  to deal  with the aggregate uncertainty introduced in  the 
model15. 
4  Calibration 
In this section we  explain the procedure we  use to assign values to the pa-
rameters of the model and the selection of functional forms.  The calibration 
consists on assigning values to parameters such that the model economy is 
able  to replicate certain statistics in  the real  economy.  In  practice,  most 
researchers  do  not  use  any  optimization procedure  to guarantee that this 
occurs.  Sometimes, researchers even use  estimates from  the empirical liter-
ature.  In  this work we  use two  procedures.  For the parameters that have a 
clear counterpart in the real economy we use the implied values.  For the rest, 
we  prefer not to use arbitrary estimations and we  use the simulated method 
of moments.  This optimization method consists in finding the values that 
minimize the distance between the statistics of the model economy and those 
of the real economy. 
15For a discussion about the problem of aggregate uncertainty in models with heteroge-
neous agents see the chapter by Victor Rios-Rull in Cooley(1995). 
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We  use firm-level data from the survey "Encuesta de  Coyuntura Laboral". 
This is a quarterly data set covering the period 1990-96.  The model period 
must be chosen such that it is consistent with the average duration of unem-
ployment and reasonable from a computation point of view.  Hence, we  have 
chosen a quarter. 
4.2  Preferences 
The utility function is linear in consumption as usual in this literature. The 
value of the discount factor f3  is fixed such that it is consistent with the mean 
annual real interest rate in the reference period, 6%.  Therefore, the implied 
f3  is 0.985. 
4.3  Production technology 
The production function is additive in the idiosyncratic and in the aggregate 
shocks Y(E, z)  =  E + z. 
One of the statistics that we  want to approximate is  the share of aggre-
gate consumption in  output.  In  the model,  aggregate consumption is  the 
output generated by firms plus household production less the costs of offer-
ing vacancies in the market.  Output in the model economy does not include 
either a public or a external sector.  We  assume this value is  approximately 
0.85.  Another statistic that we  want to approximate is the wage share.  This 
number is  0.65 in the Spanish economy. 
The optimization procedure generates the following values for the two pa-
rameters related to these statistics:  c =  0.15 and ()  =  0.15.  Previous studies 
have used values for c in the range 0.2 - 0.3, not very different from the esti-
mated value here, and the bargaining parameter has been set to 0.5 because 
of lack of information. Abowd and Lemieux (1993) estimate a value 0.3 for (). 
Aggregate shock parameters 
The aggregate shock is  modeled as a Markov chain.  We assume that the 
17 process can just take two values,  {Zl' Z2}, where Zl is the value in recessions 
and  Z2  the value in expansions.  In addition, we  assume that the expected 
duration of expansions and recessions coincide.  This implies that II(Zllz2)  = 
II(Z2Iz1)  and, therefore, it is only necessary to calibrate one parameter in the 
transition matrix. 
To  calibrate the aggregate process  we  use  the equivalence  between  an 
autorregresive process AR(I) and a first order Markov process.  We define a 
first  order Markov process with the same moments that the autorregresive 
process and use the estimations of the coefficient of correlation,  p,  and the 
standard deviation of the shock,  (Jv,  to calibrate the two values of the shock 
and the parameter in the transition matrix. 
To obtain these estimations, we  use quarterly GDP per employee in the 
period 1970-1998.  The estimated values are p  =  0.76  y  (Jv  =  0.006.  These 
values imply Zl  = 0.015,  Z2  = -0.015 y IIz(Zllzl) = 0.88. 
Transition Matrix for the  quality of the match 
We  assume that the idiosyncratic shock is  independent of the aggregate 
process.  This implies  r[(E', Z')I(E, z)]  = II(z'lz) *  7r(E'IE).  In addition,  we 
assume that there are five  possible quality levels.  In general,  this two  as-
sumptions would  imply that we  need  to impose  16  restrictions  to fix  the 
values  of the conditional transition probabilities  between  different  quality 
levels. 
Given that we do not have direct information on the quality of the match 
or on tenure, we  use  Tauchen's procedure16  to parametrize the five  quality 
match values,  as  well  as  the transition probability values.  To  apply this 
procedure we need to know the mean, standard deviation and auto  correlation 
coefficient  of the underlying idiosyncratic  process.  These  parameters are 
obtained in the optimization procedure. 
16See Tauchen (1986) 
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The return  to  household  production represents  the value  of time for  the 
household when not working in  the market.  The parameter b could be set 
such that it is  15 - 20%  of the lowest  wage  in the economy.  Since wages 
are determined endogenously in the model,  we  prefer to obtain b from the 
optimization procedure, instead of imposing any a  priori value.  The value 
that results is  b =  0.004, which is 14% of the lowest wage in the economy. 
4.5  Matching technology 
The matching function  m  =  m(vt, Ut)  is  a  Cobb-Douglas  homogeneous  of 
degree one function,  m  = m(v, u)  =  A *  VTJ(U)l-TJ.  The scale parameter A 
reflects  the degree  of mismatch in  the economy  and  TJ  is  the value for  the 
elasticity of the number of matches with respect to vacancies. 
From the optimization procedure we  obtain the following numbers:  77  = 
0.4 y A=0.2.  The value for  77  is  congruent with the estimations in empirical 
studies in the range 0.4 - 0.6. 
4.6  Firing costs 
In the period under study,  firing  a  permanent worker  entails a  cost of 45 
days salary per year worked with a maximum of 42  monthly salaries if the 
dismissal is  declared unfair.  To  compute the equilibrium we  need a  firing 
cost function that depends on previous wage  and reflects the average firing 
cost in the real economy.  Bentolila (1997)  estimates that 72%  of all firing 
processes are declared unfair and that the average cost is  around 1.5 million 
pesetas. 
The firing cost function used to compute the equilibrium is cf =  3.5w_l. 
For instance, firing a  permanent worker with seven years tenure will entail 
315  days salary.  Given that the model period is  a  quarter, w  corresponds 
to 90  days salary and 3.5w-l would be the amount to be paid for 315 days. 
Assuming that the average monthly wage is around 150.000 pesetas, 3.5w-l 
would imply a  total cost  of 1.575.000 pesetas,  which  is  approximately the 
average firing cost. 
19 In sum, the calibration involves the assignment of values to two types of 
parameters.  The discount rate and the parameters of the aggregate process 
are the only ones that are set independently of the rest since they have clear 
counterparts in the real economy.  The remaining parameters, the transition 
matrix parameters for  the quality of the match, the cost of open a vacancy 
ee,  the elasticity of new  matches with respect to the vacancy input 'T},  the 
scale parameter in the matching function A, workers bargaining power ()  and 
the household  production parameter  b,  are obtained using the method of 
simulated moments 17. 
5  Simulation results 
Tables 4,5 and 6 show simulation results18 .  To compute the model statistics 
we  have  generated series  of job creation and destruction  rates  (aggregate 
and  disaggregate  by  type  of contract),  temporary employment  rates,  job 
conversion rates and wage and consumption shares.  Then, we have computed 
means,  standard deviations and the correlations of interest for  each of the 
50  simulations of 50  periods of length each.  And finally,  we  have computed 
means  and standard deviations of these  statistics.  Since  all  variables  are 
stationary, it is not necessary to detrend the series to make the calculations. 
Table 4 shows that the model is able to replicate the means of job creation 
and job destruction rates.  This is  true both,  for  aggregate  and permanent 
employment, while it falls short when replicating the rates of temporary job 
creation and job destruction  19.  In addition, the model is  able to reproduce 
the means of temporary employment and job conversion rates. 
l7The process is  the following.  Starting with some initial values, the optimization rou-
tine calls a subroutine that computes the equilibrium and the statistics. If the statistics 
generated by the model are suffiCiently close to the real ones, the program ends.  Other-
wise, the optimization routine modifies the initial parameter values in some direction and 
calls again the subroutine that computes the equilibrium, and so on. 
18 All the statistics are quaterly. 
19Note that the model has been calibrated to match job creation rates, both aggregate 
and disaggregate,  the wage  share,  the consumption share,  the correlation between the 
conversion rate and GDP growth rate, the correlation between the job reallocation rate 
and GDP growth rate and the correlation between temporary job creation and destruction 
rates. 
20 Table 4·  Means 
Statistics  Simulated Model  Spanish Data 
Aggregate Job creation rate (JC)  3.72  2.72 
Aggregate Job destruction rate (JD)  3.77  3.21 
Permanent creation rate (JOP)  2.25  2.76 
Permanent destruction rate (J  DP)  2.19  3.08 
Temporary creation rate (Jot)  8.36  11.9 
Temporary destruction rate (J  Dt)  8.56  13.1 
Temporary employment rate  28.78  30.0 
Conversion rate  4.16  3.0 
Wage share  70.0  65.0 
Consumption share  79.49  85.0 
To study the cyclical behavior of job creation and job destruction we have 
used various indicators.  First, we have computed relative standard deviations 
of job creation and job destruction, both for  aggregate and disaggregate (per-
manent/temporary) employment.  As  Table 5 shows, the model is  consistent 
with the fact that job destruction rates are more volatile than job creation 
rates for  both types of employment.  However,  the relative volatility of tem-
porary employment is too low and that of permanent employment too high. 
Table 5·  Relative standard deviations 
Statistics  Simulated Model  Spanish data 
ReI.  std.  dev.  JD y JO  CJ"JD) 
UJe  1.61  1.79 
ReI.  std.  dev.  J DP  y JOP  (UJDP)  1.4  1.17 
UJCP 
ReI.  std.  dev.  J Dt y Jot (UJDt)  1.3  1.55 
U.Jnt 
The second indicator to look at the cyclical behavior of job creation and 
destruction is the correlation of these rates with net employment rate (NET), 
an indicator of the cycle.  The first two rows in Table 6 show the correlations 
of  aggregate job creation and destruction rates with NET.  They are quite 
similar to the observed in the data and confirm the"  stylized fact"  that the 
job reallocation process is  more intense in recessions than in expansions. 
Table 6 also  shows  the correlations of permanent job creation and de-
struction with the cycle.  The correlation of permanent job creation must 
be analyzed with some care.  The reason is  that there are important differ-
ences  between the process  of permanent job creation in this model and in 
the real economy.  First, permanent job creation is only possible via conver-
21 sion of temporary contracts into permanent jobs,  since  every job starts as 
temporary; and second,  firms  do  not have incentives to convert temporary 
contracts into permanent jobs prior to their expiration (3  years).  These two 
features of the model play against a more pro  cyclical reaction of permanent 
job creation in response to a positive shock2o . 
In any case, it is possible to test the ability of the model to replicate the 
cyclical behavior of permanent job creation by  looking at the appropriate 
statistic, i.e.  the job  conversion rate.  Hence,  Table 6 also shows  the corre-
lation of the job conversion rate (JCconv) with NET. This correlation is,  in 
fact, very close to the observed in the data.  Finally, the cyclical behavior of 
permanent job destruction is  also consistent. 
Regarding the cyclical behavior of temporary job creation and destruc-
tion, job creation is  too pro  cyclical and job destruction is  not so  counter-
cyclical as in the data.  There are two  reasons explaining the latter result. 
First,  in the model job conversion implies  temporary job destruction;  and 
second, most temporary job destruction happens upon temporary contracts 
expiration.  Both features bias the correlation of temporary job destruction 
downwards.  In fact,  this correlation improves by substracting from tempo-
rary job destruction the component due to job conversion. 
Table 6·  Correlations with NET 
Statistics  Simulated Model  Spanish Data 
Correlation (JC,NET)  0.38  0.60 
Correlation (JD,NET)  -0.54  -0.89 
Correlation (J  CP ,NET)  -0.1  0.24 
Correlation (JCconv,NET)  -0.09  0.04 
Correlation (J  DP ,NET)  -0.38  -0.48 
Correlation (J  Ct, NET)  0.63  0.44 
Correlation (J  Dt, NET)  -0.34  -0.70 
In sum, the model is  able to replicate the means and cyclical behavior of 
job creation and destruction rates both, for aggregate and permanent employ-
200ne way to get a pro  cyclical rate of permanent job creation is by allowing workers to 
search on the job and firms to hire workers directly on a permanent basis.  Another way is 
by incorporating an assumption of the efficiency wage type.  These assumptions would be 
enough to give firms incentives to convert contracts prior to expiration when the quality 
of the match is above a reservation level. 
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of temporary job creation and destruction with the cycle. 
6  Effects of a reduction in firing costs 
The goal in this section is  to quantify the effects of a 40%  reduction in the 
firing costs associated with permanent contracts, i.e.  from the mandated 45 
days salary per year worked  (in the period under consideration) to 25  days 
salary per year worked. 
Tables 7 shows that the effects on the means of job creation and destruc-
tion rates are  negligible.  At  first  sight,  this  result  could  seem  surprising, 
since it contradicts one of the main conclusions from the partial equilibrium 
lab  or demand literature 21.  According to this literature, one would expect 
an increase in permanent job creation and destruction after a reduction in 
the firing costs associated with these contracts.  However, two features of the 
model, the wage determination process and the way permanent job creation 
takes place (job conversion), help shed some light on this result. 
Permanent job  destruction rates do not increase because neither the op-
portunity cost  of continuing  with  the  match  nor  the  opportunity cost  of 
breaking it changes. 
Regarding permanent job  creation, the behavior of the job conversion rate 
agrees with the predictions of the above mentioned models.  The decrease in 
the firing  costs  improves  firms's  bargaining position,  lowering  wages  and, 
therefore, increasing the incentives to convert jobs from temporary into per-
manent.  In fact,  the job conversion rate increases substantially, from 4%  to 
6.5%. 
The most relevant effects of the reduction in firing costs are (i)  a 11.6% 
reduction in  the  temporary  employment  rate,  from  29%  to 25.5%  and  (ii) 
a  57%  increase in  the job  conversion  rate  from  temporary into permanent 
contracts, from 4%  to 6.5%  (see table 7). 
21See  Bentolila and Bertola  (1990),  Bentolila and  Saint-Paul  (1994),  Bertola (1990, 
1992) and Nickell  (1978, 1986). 
23 Table 7·  Means 
Statistics  Model cf high  Model cf low 
Aggregate Job creation rate (JC)  3.72  3.55 
Aggregate Job destruction rate (JD)  3.77  3.55 
Permanent job creation rate (JCP)  2.25  2.13 
Permanent Job destruction rate (JDP)  2.19  2.04 
Temporary job creation rate (JCt)  8.36  9.07 
Temporary job destruction rate (J  Dt)  8.56  9.06 
Temporary employment rate  28.78  25.45 
Conversion rate  4.16  6.53 
Table 8 shows The cyclical behavior of job creation and destruction rates 
before  and after the reduction in  firing  costs.  Permanent  employment  is 
more sensible to the cycle after this reduction, while temporary job creation 
and destruction evolve in the opposite way.  The reason is  clear.  Since per-
manent workers are now  easier to fire,  firms will try to reallocate when the 
opportunity cost (in terms of loss output) is lower, that is,  in recessions. 
Tabla 8:  Correlations with net employment rate 
Statistics  Model cf high  Model cf low 
Correlation (JC, NET)  0.38  0.40 
Correlation (JD,NET)  -0.54  -0.51 
Correlation (J  CP , NET)  -0.1  -0.04 
Correlation (J  DP , NET)  -0.38  -0.45 
Correlation (J ct, NET)  0.63  0.61 
Correlation (J  Dt , NET)  -0.34  -0.14 
Last, this exercise confirms the puzzle presented in the beginning.  That 
is,  a high firing cost economy (rigid economy) may offer the same aggregate 
statistics than a low  firing cost economy  (flexible economy).  The reason is 
that the reduction in firing costs affects  differently the cyclical behavior of 
permanent and temporary employment  (see  Table 8).  Temporary employ-
ment is no longer used as an adjustment mechanism but, instead, is simply 
used as a screening device.  In fact, as we  have seen in this exercise, the in-
crease in the job conversion rate from temporary into permanent employment 
is one of the most significant effects. 
24 7  Conclusions 
In  this  paper we  have  accomplished  two  goals.  The first  was  to  build  a 
model that is  able to replicate the Spanish labor market facts  concerning 
job creation and destruction.  The second was  to quantify the effects  of a 
reduction in the firing costs associated with permanent contracts. 
The motivation of the paper was the surprising similarity between Spanish 
and US  aggregate statistics (job creation and destruction rates), resembling 
very efficient labor markets, despite the obvious differences in labor protec-
tion laws.  As shown in Section 6, it is possible that an economy characterized 
by  (i)  high firing costs associated to permanent contracts,  (ii)  segmentation 
in the labor market,  (iii)  excessive  turnover,  (iv)  high temporary rates and 
(v)  low job conversion rates from temporary into permanent contracts offers 
the same aggregate statistics than a flexible  economy,  characterized by low 
firing costs.  Hence, the countercyclical behavior of the Spanish job realloca-
tion rate cannot be attributed to the existence of negligible firing costs,  as 
argued in most studies when comparing job reallocation rates across US  and 
European labor markets,  but to the existence of temporary contracts that 
have opened a way to circumvent them. 
Once  the  model  was  able  to  replicate  reasonably  well  the behavior of 
Spanish job creation and job destruction rates,  we  performed a simulation 
exercise  consisting of a  40%  reduction  in  the firing  costs  associated  with 
permanent contracts.  The main effects  were  a  decrease  in  the temporary 
employment rate from  29%  to %25.5  and an increase in the job conversion 
rate from 4%  to 6.5%.  In this flexible economy (low firing costs), temporary 
employment is no longer used as an adjustment mechanism since permanent 
employment has become cheaper, but as a screening device.  Note that these 
two  effects,  the decrease in the temporary rate and the increase in the job 
conversion rate have important implications for workers  productivity, since 
excessive turnover prevents workers from  acquiring firm specific skills. 
The most  surprising result  was  the  negligible  effect  on  the permanent 
job destruction rate.  However,  once  we  take  into  account  the way  wages 
are  determined,  it is  reasonable  that permanent job destruction does  not 
25 increase after the reduction in firing costs.  On the other hand, the effects on 
the permanent job creation rate (the job conversion rate in this model) are 
coherent with the predictions from  the partial equilibrium models of labor 
demand. 
Finally,  job creation  and destruction  cyclical  behavior  changed  as  ex-
pected.  Permanent job reallocation became more countercyclical while tem-
porary job reallocation reacted in the opposite way.  The fact that permanent 
employment became cheaper after the reduction in firing costs, made firms re-
allocate more efficiently.  That is, job reallocation was mostly accomplished in 
recessions, when the opportunity costs, in terms of output losses, was lower. 
This model has mainly two  limitations.  First, it would  be desirable to 
introduce on the job search to get correlations more similar to the observed in 
the data.  For instance, the permanent job reallocation rate and the perma-
nent relative standard deviations in the model are too high.  This is  because 
firms  are not allowed to hire permanent workers directly and there is no on 
the job search.  These  elements would  make job creation more pro  cyclical 
and, as  a consequence, the job reallocation rate would be less  countercycli-
cal, as in the data. Second, the way wages are determined weakens the effects 
of the reduction in firing costs on job creation and job destruction. 
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